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Comment
Doe v. Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of
Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort
Statute
Michele Brandt
On about April 15, 1992, Bosnian-Serb soldiers decapitated
Ks son while she held him in her arms.1 Bosnian-Serb Soldiers
later captured K, sent her to a detention camp, and raped her
ten times daily for twenty-one days.2 On May 31, 1992, eight
Bosnian-Serb soldiers raped a teenage prisoner (Jane Doe I)
while she was imprisoned in a Bosnian-Serb concentration
camp. After the ordeal, one of the soldiers slashed Jane Doe rs
breasts. 3 On June 28, 1992, soldiers beat an eighteen-year-old
1. K approached the entrance to her home and was accosted by four Ser-
bian soldiers, known as "chetniks." One told her that he had come "to take one
of your children so that you remember well what we chetniks know how to do."
Plaintiff Is Complaint at 7, Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(No. 93-Civ-1163). The soldiers attempted to forcibly remove Is son from her
arms. She resisted. She heard her son scream and looked down to see his head
resting on the floor in a puddle of blood. Id. The rest of her son's body remained
cradled in her arms. K lost consciousness. Id. When she regained conscious-
ness she located her living son and fled the city. Id.
Ks first name was withheld because she feared for her safety if Bosnian-
Serb soldiers discovered her identity. The additional plaintiffs in this suit in-
cluded Is "twin sons and two organizations of Muslim and Croation women."
Id. at 2.
2. Id. at 8. The camp functioned as a "rape/death camp for women and a
camp for reproducing 'Serbian' babies through forced impregnation." Id. Ser-
bian soldiers raped all the women and girls, some as young as three or four
years old, on beds with bloody sheets. The soldiers often forced brothers and
husbands to watch the rapes. Id. The raping room resembled a movie theatre;
it was dark, and the bed was lit with a solitary spot light. Id. During the rapes,
Serbian soldiers insulted K regarding her Croat and Muslim ancestry. Id.
3. Plaintiff Doe's Complaint, Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (No. 93-Civ-1163). Jane Doe I was standing in line with a group of 15
women waiting to obtain water rations when the Bosnian-Serb soldiers ap-
proached. They separated out Jane Doe I and six of the younger women from
the group and led them to a house in an adjacent field. Id. at 5-6. The women
were forced to undress and walk in a circle while the soldiers screamed obscen-
ities at them. After approximately 15 minutes, the soldiers began to rape the
women. Jane Doe I attempted to resist and she was beaten and forcibly held
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woman (Jane Doe II) while she watched Bosnian-Serb soldiers
rape her mother.4 On September 7, 1994, these women and chil-
dren, on behalf of themselves and all other victims of gross
human rights abuses perpetrated by Bosnian-Serb forces,5
brought two related class action lawsuits in the United States
against Radovan Karadzic, head of the self-proclaimed "Bos-
nian-Serb Republic" and leader of the Bosnian-Serb military
forces.6 Plaintiffs personally served Karadzic in New York in
February 1993. Plaintiffs alleged multiple tortious acts in viola-
tion of international treaties, covenants, agreements, customary
international law, and state law.7 Both actions, Doe v. Karadzic
and K v. Karadzic (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Karadzic"), asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort
down. She fainted. Another soldier was raping her when she regained con-
sciousness. Id. at 6.
Jane Doe I was returned to the camp after a Bosnian-Serb whom she had
known previously intervened on her behalf. The other young women remained
behind; two never returned. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff Jane Doe I filed her complaint anonymously because she feared for
her safety if her identity was discovered. Id. at 3. As of February 11, 1993,
Jane Doe I was living as a refugee in Zagreb, Croatia. Id.
4. Id. at 3, 6. After the soldiers raped Jane Doe I's mother, they took her
mother down the hallway and the children heard their mother scream. The
soldiers returned with a bloody knife and threatened to rape Jane Doe II. Her
brother thwarted the attack, and Jane Doe 11 escaped by hiding under a bal-
cony. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff Jane Doe H also filed her complaint against Karadzic anony-
mously out of fear for her safety. Id. at 3.
5. Jane Doe I brought suit "on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated." Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 734. Jane Doe 11 brought suit "on behalf of
herself as administratrix of the estate of her deceased mother, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated." Id. According to Jane Doe I and Jane Doe H,
members of the class action consisted of "women and men who suffered rape,
summary execution, other torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment inflicted by Bosnian-Serb military forces ... between April 1992 and the
present." Plaintiff Doe's Complaint at 4, Karadzic (No. 93-Civ-1163). The
Center for Constitutional Rights, the International League for Human Rights,
and the International Women's Human Rights Clinic of the City University of
New York (CUNY) Law School submitted the action on behalf of plaintiffs Doe I
and Doe 11. Id. at 11. K brought suit "on her own behalf and on behalf of her
infant sons B. and 0." Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 734. K's action was also
brought on behalf of survivors of mass rape, forcible impregnation, prostitution,
genocidal torture, and discrimination. Id. at 835-36. Catherine MacKinnon
and the Legal Defense and Education Fund submitted K's action.
Both the Doe plaintiffs and K plaintiffs "claim that they and others simi-
larly situated are the victims of a genocidal campaign." Karadzic, 866 F. Supp.
at 736.
6. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 735.
7. Doe plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. K plaintiffs
also sought injunctive relief. Id.
1414
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Statute, a federal statute that grants federal district courts orig-
inal jurisdiction for violations of international law committed by
aliens, even outside the country.8 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the law-
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.9 The court held that
an action brought against a non-state actor-as it found
Karadzic to be'O-for violations of customary international law
did not lie within the jurisdictional scope of the Alien Tort
Statute."
The Karadzic case raises the question whether the Alien
Tort Statute provides a cause of action against a non-state actor
for gender-specific abuses and other human rights violations
that forces allegedly under his command and control committed
during an armed conflict. The issue is novel; no court has yet
confirmed that the Alien Tort Statute imposes individual liabil-
ity upon leaders or members of organized, armed groups that
violate either United States treaties or customary international
law. A decision that non-state actors can be held responsible in
United States courts for gender-specific and other abuses under
international law would strongly condemn such atrocities. 12
This Comment asserts that the Karadzic court erred by re-
fusing to acknowledge, pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, that
certain treaties and customary international norms reach non-
state conduct. In so doing, the court failed to address directly
many of the plaintiffs' allegations, including those of gender-spe-
cific abuses. Part I provides a background to the Bosnian armed
conflict, summarizes the reports of egregious human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Bosnian-Serb forces, and outlines the
framework for adjudication of such claims under the Alien Tort
Statute. Part H examines the holding and reasoning of the fed-
eral district court of New York in Karadzic. Part III critiques
the district court's decision and proposes an appropriate analy-
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). Plaintiffs also claimed jurisdiction under the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)); federal question jurisdiction; and the principles
of supplemental jurisdiction. 866 F. Supp. at 735. Although the court could
have granted subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to each of these claims, this
Comment focuses exclusively on the Alien Tort Statute.
9. 866 F. Supp. at 736.
10. Id. at 741.
11. Id.
12. A number of the human rights violations alleged inKaradzic were gen-
der specific. See infra notes 91, 100, 162 and accompanying text (discussing
gender-specific abuses). A complete discussion of whether international law
covers gender specific abuses, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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sis of international instruments that the Karadzic court failed to
address. This Comment concludes that the Alien Tort Statute
encompasses the acts of ethnic cleansing, including gender-spe-
cific abuses, that should be imputed to Karadzic as head of the
Bosnian-Serb Republic and armed forces.
I. REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARISING OUT
OF ThE BOSNIAN ARMED CONFLICT
IN U.S. COURTS
A. THE ARMED CONFLICT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
In 1991, the former Yugoslavia1 3 began to disintegrate.14
Members of the coalition government of Bosnia-Hercegovina
("Bosnia")1 5 disagreed about whether to remain a constituent re-
public of Yugoslavia or to secede. 16 In a February 1992 referen-
dum, Bosnia's citizens voted in favor of independence. 17
13. The former Yugoslavia was a federation comprising six constituent re-
publics: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. HELSmn WATCH, WAR CRImEs IN BOSNIA-HERcEGOVINA 22
(1992).
14. For a discussion of the history leading up to the ethnic conflicts in Yu-
goslavia, see ALEx N. DRAGNICH, SERBS AND CROATS: THE STRUGGLE IN YUGO-
sLAViA (1992).
In June 1991, after Serbia blocked a proposal by Croatia and Slovenia to
restructure Yugoslavia as a loose federation of republics, Croatia and Slovenia
declared independence. FRANK NEwMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHrs: LAw, PoucY, AND PROCESS (2d ed. forthcoming) (draft of chap-
ter 22 at 72, on file with author). Fighting broke out between the Yugoslav
army (JNA) and the Slovenian national guard. Although the JNA withdrew
from Slovenia pursuant to a ceasefire, Yugoslavia sent additional JNA troops to
Croatia to back Croatian-Serb units attempting to establish Serbian-controlled
enclaves within Croatia. HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 30. The fighting
quickly spread to the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In early 1992, the United
Nations brokered a ceasefire in Croatia. By April 27, 1992, however, the repub-
lics of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia had already formally de-
clared their independence. Id. The remaining republics of Serbia and
Montenegro declared themselves the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Id.
15. The Bosnian government was initially a coalition consisting of the Mus-
lim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croation Democratic Union (HDC),
and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), representing, as of 1992, a population
totalling 4.35 million. This population was 43.7% Slavic Muslims, 31.3%
Serbs, and 17.3% Croats. HELSINa WATCH, supra note 13, at 19. The Bosnian
Parliament included representatives from seven different parties, both national
and non-national in nature. Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Hearing
before the Comm. on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1993) (statement of the Honorable Haris Silajclezic, Foreign Minister of
Bosnia-Herzegovnia).
16. HEILSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 32.
17. Id. Muslim and Croat voters, associated with the SDA and HDC re-
spectively, overwhelmingly supported independence. Id. at 19. Expressing its
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Radovan Karadzic, self-proclaimed president of the Serbian
Democratic Party SDS, warned that if the Muslim and Croat
parties demanded independence from the republic of Yugoslavia,
an ethnic war would be inevitable.18
After the international community recognized Bosnia as an
independent state on April 6, 1992,19 sporadic ethnic violence
escalated into a full-scale armed conflict between the Bosnian
Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.20 Karadzic im-
mediately proclaimed a "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina"2 ' independent of Bosnia, declared himself presi-
dent,22 and claimed two-thirds of Bosnia's territory on behalf of
the new "Republic."23
desire that Bosnia remain part of Yugoslavia, the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) boycotted the referendum and declared the results invalid. Id.
18. Roy GuTmAN, WrNEss TO GENOCIDE 12-13 (1993). Karadzic added
"that the ethnic conflict in the republic would make Northern Ireland look like
'a seaside holiday.'" Id.
19. HELsucm WATCH, supra note 13, at 30.
20. Id. Reports suggest that the long simmering conflict erupted on April
6, 1992, following events at a mass demonstration:
The demonstrators were protesting Serbia's role in Bosnian Politics.
There were rumors of Bosnia gaining independence, and then mem-
bers of Mr. Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party ... opened fire on the
crowd .... The crowd stormed the hotel, and Mr. Karadzic and his
main followers fled .... That evening Serbian heavy guns opened up
on the city from the hills, beginning the siege of Sarajevo.
Alan C. Laifer, Never Again? The "Concentration Camps" in Bosnia-
Hercegovina: A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEW EUR. L. REV.
159, 192 n.4 (1994) (quoting John F. Burns, Bosnians in Besieged Sarejevo Look
Back on Year of Horror, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 6, 1993, at Al, A14). For additional
information on the background to the Bosnian armed conflict, see AmNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL, BOSNIA-HERCEGOViNA GROSS ABusEs OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1992).
21. The Bosnian-Serb entity is not officially recognized as a state by the
community of nations. The United Nations, the European Community, and the
United States have refused to recognized the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb en-
tity. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Arguably, how-
ever, the Bosnian-Serb Republic qualifies as a "state" under international law
and therefore acquires the duties and obligations that accompany such status.
To qualify as a state the Bosnian-Serb entity must meet the following estab-
lished international legal criteria: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined
territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to engage in formal relations
with other states. I RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 (1987); see also Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100 (1933) (listing criteria for an entity to achieve
international legal recognition as a state).
22. The so-called Bosnian-Serb Republic has also formed a parliament
which, among other things, has considered the endorsement of peace plans (e.g.,
the 1993 Vance-Owen peace plan) that Karadzic submitted to it. See HELsiNm
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF AcrIvrIEs
1992, at 14 (1993) [hereinafter HELSINm REPORT].
23. HELSInKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 30.
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From its inception, Bosnia's ethnic conflict was interna-
tional in scope. Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces were re-
spectively supported by troops and material from the
reconstituted Yugoslavia 24 and the Croatian Republic.2 5 Since
June 1992, Bosnian Serb forces have fought Bosnian govern-
ment forces and Croatian troops partnered in an uneasy mili-
tary alliance. 26 On June 20, 1992, Bosnia's president formally
declared that the country was in a state of war.2 7
24. After Bosnia-Hercegovina fell into armed conflict, the Yugoslav Army
(JNA) joined forces with Bosnian-Serb paramilitary units. HELsnm WATCH,
supra note 13, at 9. Under pressure from the United Nations Security Council,
which imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, HELsiimi REPORT, supra note
22, at 67, the JNA ostensibly withdrew from Bosnia on May 19, 1992. HELsiNKI
WATCH, supra note 13, at 9. Yugoslav soldiers and officers, however, stayed
behind to aid their Bosnian-Serb comrades. On the same day as the JNA's for-
mal withdrawal, Karadzic announced the creation of a Bosnian-Serb army to
solidify Serbian-controlled territory. Id. at 35-36. Reports estimate that the
already formidable Bosnian-Serb forces under Karadzic's control were enlarged
by at least 30,000 soldiers, who remained in Bosnia after the JNA withdrew
and represented an estimated two-thirds of total Bosnian-Serb forces. Id. at 30.
In addition to military forces, the Yugoslav government provided economic
and political support to the Bosnian-Serb army. Id. at 10. According to observ-
ers, "Serbian paramilitary groups conduct military operations in conjunction
with, in the presence of, or with the knowledge of JNA forces and commanders."
Id. at 38.
Moreover, the Serbian President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, has
had a great influence over Karadzic. After Karadzic agreed to submit a peace
plan before the Pale Serb parliament, reporters noted that Milosevic had "suc-
cessfully browbeaten Karadzic, his long-time nationalist acolyte, into accepting
the peace deal." Blaine Harden, Bosnian Serb Leader Agrees to Peace Plan,
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1993, at A15.
Evidence of a more direct relationship between the Yugoslavian govern-
ment and the Bosnian-Serb leadership may exist. A recent defector from the
Yugoslavian Secret Police turned over documents indicating that Yugoslavian
authorities were explicitly directing the ethnic cleansing campaign carried out
by the Bosnian-Serbs. One document, addressed to Karadzic, if genuine, would
represent evidence that Yugoslavia considered Karadzic the leader of the Bos-
nian-Serbs holding command and control authority over both the armed forces
and de facto governmental structures. Such a document might also be proof
that Karadzic was aware of the ethnic cleansing campaign being carried out by
forces under his control and acted in concert with Yugoslavia. See Roger Cohen,
Serb Defector Offers Evidence on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al.
The chief prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [hereinafter
War Crimes Tribunal] has named Karadzic as a suspected war criminal. Roger
Cohen, Bosnian Serb Denies All at a War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,
1995, at A3.
25. The Bosnian-Croats have received direct military support from neigh-
boring Croatia. HELsmI REPORT, supra note 22, at 13.
26. HELSNi I WATCH, supra note 13, at 33.
27. Id. at 31.
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ALIEN TORT STATUTE
B. "ETmac CLEANSING"28 AND GENDER-SPECIFIC ABUSES 2 9
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic has stated that "[i]t is impos-
sible for Serbs to live together with other peoples in a unitary
state."30 Consistent with his position, the Yugoslav army (JNA)
and Bosnian-Serb troops have tried to unite Serbian-controlled
areas in the former Yugoslavian republics to create a homoge-
nous "Greater Serbia."3 ' To attain this goal, they employ
rape,3 2 summary executions, 33 torture, and other egregious
28. "'[E]thnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous
by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Annex
(1994). U.N. experts assert that parties to the Bosnian armed conflict have
engaged in "ethnic cleansing":
On the basis of the information gathered, examined and analyzed, the
Commission [of Experts] has concluded that grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and other violations of international
humanitarian law have been committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia on a large scale, and were particularly brutal and ferocious
in their execution. The practice of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and
rape and sexual assault, in particular, have been carried out by some of
the parties so systematically that they strongly appear to be the
product of a policy, which may also be inferred from the consistent
failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and
punish their perpetrators.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary General
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/19941674 (1994).
29. Although this Comment looks at violence against women, its legal
analysis applies equally to the sexual assault of men. Reports indicate that
Bosnian-Serb forces have castrated some men or forced men to perform acts of
sexual violence on one another. INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAw GROUP, No
JUSTICE, No PEACE: AccouNTABIrrY FOR RAPE AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAvIA 4 (1993) [hereinafter No JusTIcE, No PEACE].
30. HELSmINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 46. Karadzic has expressed fear of
persecution of a Serbian minority in a unified Bosnian state. Id. He has also
publicly voiced his belief that only Serbians should populate his republic:
Responding to the question of how he envisions the status of minorities
in the Serbian Republic, Radovan Karadzic readily answers that his
Republic will not have such problems as 95 percent of the population
will be of Serbian origin. Keeping in mind the explicit intermingling of
ethnic groups before the conflicts, and the predominant domination of
non-Serb populations in areas which have been now claimed by the
Greater Serbian ideologues, it becomes clear that such a statement
represents either a lie or an accidental confession to the policy of ethnic
cleansing carried out by the Serbs.
CROATIAN INFORMATION CENTER, GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN NORTHWEST-
ERN BOSNIA 107 (1993).
31. HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 47. For a discussion of the "Territo-
rialization of the 'Greater Serbian' Idea," see CROATIAN INFORMATION CENTER,
supra note 30, at 11-17.
32. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (documenting Bosnian-Serb
program of rape).
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human rights violations3 4 to "ethnically cleanse" hundreds of
thousands of non-Serb residents3 5 from areas of strategic
importance.3 6
Mass rape and other gender-specific abuses are an integral
part of the Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing campaign.31 Further-
more, Bosnian-Serb forces act with impunity.38 Helsinki Watch
has noted that "[t]he public nature of the abuses, and the fre-
quency with which they take place indicate that individual [Ser-
bian] soldiers and military units do not anticipate disciplinary
action by their superiors."39 Indeed, countless sources report
that the practice of mass rape by Serb soldiers is not merely a
private act, but is carried out under orders to facilitate "ethnic
cleansing."40 Bosnian Serb forces have established "rape camps"
in detention centers, schools, and prisons 41 where they repeat-
33. HELS a WATCH, supra note 13, at 50 ("[C]ivilians are being summa-
rily executed as part of an 'ethnic cleansing' campaign."). Reports indicate that
Bosnian-Serb forces have conducted mass executions of whole non-Serb village
populations to "cleanse" areas. Id. at 63.
34. Other violations of human rights include forced displacement, geno-
cide, and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment. Id. at 63 (finding that
"ethnic cleansing" involves the forcible displacement of non-Serbs); I[ HELSINKI
WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOViNA 10-13, 42-84, 220-22, 258-68,
382-390 (1993).
35. No JUSTICE, No PEACE, supra note 29, at 1.
36. Id. Recognizing this fact, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights condemned the systematic killing, torture, rapes, forced displacement,
and other violence associated with ethnic cleansing for which the Serb leader-
ship and military forces in Bosnia and Yugoslavia are responsible. HELSnm
REPORT, supra note 22, at 67-68.
37. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Ethnic cleansing has pro-
duced an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 Bosnian rape victims. See, e.g., Tom Post
et al., Crimes of War: A Pattern of Rape in Bosnia, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at
32.
38. GuTmAN, supra note 18, at 157-163. To date, no reports have indicated
that Serb leaders have held accountable any member of their forces for human
rights abuses. II HELsIN WATCH, supra note 34, at 8-9.
39. II HELsnm WATCH, supra note 34, at 8.
40. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Annex, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. A/48/
92-S/25341/Annex (1993); European Community Investigative Mission into the
Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia: Report to EC Foreign
Ministers, Annex 1, at 6, U.N. Doc. S/25240/Annex (1993); GUTmAN, supra note
18, at 164; Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & CoTrrEMP. PROBs. 345 (1993); Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon
of War: Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 199 (1994); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under
International Humanitarian Law, 87 Am. J. ]N'L L. 424-27 (1993).
41. International observers report:
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edly rape women. 42 Rape survivors are often subjected to forced
pregnancy and forced maternity.43 Serb captors deliberately de-
tain pregnant women past the period for obtaining legal
abortions.44
According to rape victims, Serb military and political com-
manders at a minimum condoned, if not ordered, gender-specific
assaults. 45 Evidence presented at the first Bosnian war crimes
trial corroborates these testimonials. 46 One Serbian soldier tes-
tified that local orders to rape Muslim girls and women came
from the head of the Bosnian Serb armed forces, Radovan
Karadzic.47
C. ADJUDICATION OF HUmAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONs COMMITTED
DURING THE BosNL4,N ARMED CONFLCT UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
1. The Alien Tort Statute: A Cause of Action for Human
Rights Abuses
The Alien Tort Statute is an avenue available to the Bos-
nian victims of mass rape and other abuses to ensure that those
responsible for such acts are held accountable. 48 The Alien Tort
In southeastern Bosnia, Serbian forces use rape as one of many meth-
ods of torturing and humiliating women. Many women and their fami-
lies are forcibly expelled from their villages ... and they are either
placed in designated detention facilities or interned in villages ....
The women are sexually mistreated during their detention, and many
are gang-raped on one or more occasions.
1 HELSmKi WATCH, supra note 34, at 242.
42. A Muslim woman raped by Bosnian-Serb soldiers at an outdoor sta-
dium testified that she counted 29 assailants before losing consciousness. GUT-
MAN, supra note 18, at 166.
43. See Danise Aydelott, Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian
Rapists Under International Law, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 585, 599 (1993); Kohn,
supra note 40, at 199; Yolanda S. Wu, Genocidal Rape in Bosnia: Redress in
United States Courts Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 4 UCLA WOmEN's L.J.
101, 103 (1993).
44. See Post et al., supra note 37, at 32. Their purpose is clear. Serbian
rapists intend to force Muslim and Croat women to bear Serbian children. Nu-
merous rape accounts indicate that Serb perpetrators taunted their victims
with words to the effect, "Now youll have a Serb baby." No JUSTICE, No PEACE,
supra note 29, at 3.
45. Roy Gutman, Rape Camp: Evidence Serb Leaders in Bosnia OK'd At-
tacks, N.Y. NEwsDAY, Apr. 19, 1993, at 5.
46. Serb on Trial Describes Crimes in Chilling Detail, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 14,
1993, at A.
47. Id.
48. Another avenue was created pursuant to chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter. The Security Council established a War Crimes Tribunal. The
Security Council created the tribunal after it determined that rampant viola-
1995] 1421
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Statute49 permits an alien 50 to bring a civil action in the United
States District Courts for torts committed in violation of a
United States treaty or of the law of nations.51 Courts construe
the term "law of nations" under the Alien Tort Statute as refer-
ring to customary international law.52
Originally a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Alien
Tort Statute languished for nearly 200 years in relative obscu-
rity.53 In 1980,14 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals revived
the statute in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,55 a landmark decision
that established a unique, albeit limited,56 avenue for vindicat-
tions of humanitarian law in Bosnia constituted a threat to international peace.
See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of Interna-
tional Law, 88 AM. J. IT'L L. 78, 79 (1994) (citing Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/
25704/Annex (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192). Article 5 of the
statute of the tribunal gives it authority to prosecute crimes against humanity
"when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in charac-
ter, and directed against any civilian population." Id. at 86. Significantly, the
statute provides that rape can constitute a crime against humanity. Id. at 84.
To date, however, no prosecutions have resulted from the War Crimes Tribunal,
even though 21 indictments have been filed against Serbs for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. Richard Meares, U.N. Judge Wants
Chief Culprits of War Crimes, REUTER NEWSWIRE, Mar. 13, 1995.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
50. An "alien" is defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)(e) (1988), as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States."
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The "law of nations" encompasses both treaty law
and customary international law. See infra part I.C.l.b.
52. See infra part I.C.l.b. This Comment will refer to "law of nations" and
"customary international law" interchangeably.
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Iralo, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.21 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. Lawyers in the 1980s became increasingly aware of and interested in
protecting human rights. Consequently, numerous lawyers gained knowledge
of international law and the Alien Tort Statute, leading to a resurgence in the
use of the statute. NaWMAN & WRIsSBRODT, supra note 14, at 8; Joan Fitzpat-
rick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In re
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 491, 492 (1993).
55. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, two Paraguayan plaintiffs
brought suit against a Paraguayan police officer for the murder and torture of a
close family member in Paraguay. The plaintiffs obtained personal jurisdiction
over the officer while he was visiting the United States illegally. Id. at 878-79.
56. Several procedural obstacles restrict access to alien tort actions: per-
sonal jurisdiction, foreign sovereign immunity, act of state doctrine, head of
state immunity, diplomatic immunity, and the political question doctrine. For
a discussion of the barriers to claims grounded in immunities, see generally
Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S.
Courts, 7 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 177 (1994); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Com-
ment, Understanding the Act of State Doctrine's Effect, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 58
(1988) (providing an approach to aid adjudication of the acts of state doctrine);
Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity:
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ing violations of human rights. According to Filartiga, federal
courts have jurisdiction over Alien Tort Statute claims only if
international law proscribes the tortious conduct at issue.57
This proscription may exist in either prong of the Alien Tort
Statute-a United States treaty or the law of nations.
a. The Treaty Law Prong of the Alien Tort Statute
The United States Constitution expressly refers to treaties
as part of domestic law: "All Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."5 8 The term "treaty" refers to "bind-
The Defined Right of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 169 (1986) (defining head of
state immunity and offering a better defined standard).
57. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 14, at 14. Most courts have fol-
lowed Filartiga in finding that the Alien Tort Statute grants both jurisdiction
and a cause of action for torts cognizable in international law. For opinions
holding that a plaintiff need not establish an independent cause of action when
pleading a tort in violation of the "law of nations," see In re Estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that claim must only include a tort and a violation of international law) and
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that
proposed tort must be characterized by universal consensus in the international
community). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (stating that a cause of action cannot be im-
plied from a grant of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
For statements holding that "a right of action can be located in interna-
tional law itself for certain egregious customary international law violations,"
see NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 14, at 29.
58. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. Although a treaty ratified by the U.S. repre-
sents the supreme law of the land, it is enforceable in U.S. courts only if it is
self-executing or if Congress enacts enabling legislation. FRANK NWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBROur, INTERNATioNAL HumAN IGHTS: LAw, POLICY, AND PROCESS
579 (1990). Some commentators assert that:
self-execution is irrelevant to... jurisdiction [under the Alien Tort
Statute] .... As with other jurisdictional showings, such as amount-
in-controversy and substantial federal question, plaintiffs need only
make a colorable claim that the relevant treaty has been violated, as a
prerequisite for the consideration of a tort. The cause of action under
[the Alien Tort Statute] is "for a tort only," and not strictly speaking for
a violation of the treaty provisions. Whether a treaty is self-executing
is thus a distinct set of problems from whether it imposes a legal obli-
gation or not... which is the only relevant issue for determining
whether... jurisdiction will lie.
Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53, 99 n.198 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Jordan J.
Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History
and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
543, 627-28, 638-43 (1989) (asserting that the Alien Tort Statute serves an "ex-
ecuting" function for treaties).
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ing agreements between subjects of international law that are
governed by international law."59 For a treaty violation to be
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute, the United States must
be a party to the instrument. 60
b. The Law of Nations Prong of the Alien Tort Statue
The law of nations derives from a variety of sources, includ-
ing customary international law.61 Customary international
law consists of norms reflecting the general practices that States
follow due to a sense of legal obligation.62 These norms require
no agreement or treaty to be binding upon all nations.63 Consis-
tent state practice, generally defined as "widespread acceptance"
of a norm, is evidence of the ripening of a norm into customary
international law.64 Widely accepted treaties, such as the Ge-
59. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 386
(2d ed. 1987).
60. The United States becomes a party to a treaty by ratification or by ac-
cession. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 58, at 400. "Accession" is "[tihe
absolute or conditional acceptance by one or several nations of a treaty already
concluded between other sovereignties." BLACoxs LAw DICTIoNARY 13 (5th ed.
1979).
61. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines the law of na-
tions as the following:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d .... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules of law.
U.N. CHARTER art. 38.
62. NEwMAN & WEiSSBRODT, supra note 58, at 594. Customary interna-
tional law is established from the "general and consistent practice of states."
See I RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102. In determining what constitutes cus-
tomary international law, courts refer to the works ofjurists, usage of nations,
and judicial opinions. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)
(quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)). For a
plaintiff to establish a customary norm, it must be "universal, definable, and
obligatory," however, the "plaintiff need not establish unanimity among na-
tions." Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Nonethe-
less, "[a]n international tort which appears and disappears as one travels
around the world is clearly lacking in that level of common understanding nec-
essary to create universal consensus." Id. at 712.
63. I RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102.
64. IAN BROwNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 5-6 (4th ed.
1990) (quoting Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J.
3).
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neva Conventions 65 and the Genocide Convention,66 may also
indicate the creation of customary international law.6 7
The United States Supreme Court has stated that custom-
ary international law is "part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented."68 Customary international law is constantly
evolving.69 Hence, United States courts must continuously eval-
uate whether a given norm has risen to the status of customary
international law.70
As established in Filartiga,71 a violation of a norm of cus-
tomary international law is actionable under the Alien Tort
Statue.7 2 Thus, because the United States had not yet ratified a
treaty prohibiting torture, the court in Filartiga looked to
whether torture violated the "law of nations."73 The Filartiga
court held that official acts of torture, regardless of where com-
mitted, violate customary international law.74 Subsequently, a
United States district court found that prolonged arbitrary de-
65. For a discussion of the acceptance of Geneva Conventions as part of
customary international law, see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25204 (1993), re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1 35 [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report]. The Geneva
Conventions are nearly universally accepted by the nations of the world. In-
deed, more states are signatories to the Geneva Convention than the United
Nations Charter. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Convention as Customary Law,
81 AM. J. INTL L. 348, 348 n.2 (1987).
66. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 65, 35 (indicating that the
Genocide Convention has become customary international law); Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1110, 1129 (1982); I RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. d & reporters'
cmt. 3.
67. D'Amato, supra note 66, at 1127-29. In the human rights arena, wide
acceptance of international treaties, declarations, resolutions, and other instru-
ments arguably has become a more significant indicator of the development of
customary international law than the general practice of states. NEwMAN &
WEISBRoryr, supra note 58, at 595.
68. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
69. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN IHTS AND HUmA rrAmAN NORMS AS Cus-
TOMARY LAw 99 (1989) (noting that the list of norms rising to the status of cus-
tomary international law should be regarded as "open ended").
70. NEWmAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 58, at 595.
71. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 884-85, 887.




tentions, disappearances, and summary executions also violate
customary international law.75
2. International Law Germane to the Bosnian Armed Conflict
The human rights abuses perpetrated during the Bosnian
armed conflict unquestionably violate the four Geneva Conven-
tions76 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention"). 77 Each of
these instruments is widely regarded as having risen to the sta-
tus of customary international law.78 Hence, torts committed in
contravention of these instruments are cognizable as violations
of both customary international law and a United States treaty
under the Alien Tort Statute.
75. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding
that acts of torture, summary execution, disappearances, and prolonged arbi-
trary detention are universally prohibited).
76. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Vic-
tims, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tions]. The following four multilateral agreements comprise the Geneva
Conventions: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. The United States is a party
to the Geneva Conventions. See NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 58, at 401
(listing many human rights treaties to which the United States is a party).
77. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The
United States is a party to the Convention. See NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 58, at 402.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), is also actionable under
the Alien Tort Statute. Most importantly, Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment." Id. art. 7. The discussion in the text of the issues ad-
dressed by the treaties, however, mirror a discussion of the ICCPR. Although
the ICCPR is a significant international instrument and recently ratified by the
United States, a discussion of this Convention is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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a. The Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions are major components of the body
of humanitarian law,79 providing for humane treatment of non-
combatants in wartime.80 The degree of protection such persons
receive varies depending on whether the armed conflict 8 l is in-
ternational8 2 or non-international (internal).8 3 The Geneva
79. International humanitarian law has existed for over a century and has
developed separately from human rights law. For a history of humanitarian
law, see JEAN PicTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PR NCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HumAN-
rrARiN LAw (1985). Unlike humanitarian law, human rights law guarantees
fundamental liberties during periods of peace and conflict. Humanitarian law
and human rights law are closely related, and many of the prohibitions en-
trenched in humanitarian law are reflected in core principles of human rights
law.
80. Id. at 61-68; NEWMAN & WEIssBRoDT, supra note 58, at 688.
81. At least one commentator has refined the international-internal dis-
tinction for purposes of humanitarian law into four categories of conflicts: 1) An
international armed conflict or occupation; 2) A war of national liberation or
self-determination; 3) A non-international conflict under Common Article 3;
and 4) A non-international conflict under Additional Protocol II. David Weissb-
rodt, The Role of International Organizations in the Implementation of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situation of Armed Conflict, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT7'L L. 313, 338-340 (1988). To analyze the Bosnian conflict under the
Alien Tort Statue, this Comment limits its discussion to the first and third
types of conflicts.
82. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on
the Geneva Conventions defines an international armed conflict as any "differ-
ence arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces
... even if one of the Parties denies the existence of the state of war." CoMMEN-
TARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AuGUST 1949, at 34 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1952) [hereinafter ICRC CoMMENTARY].
83. Internal armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3. The "au-
thoritative ICRC commentary mentions a number of nonobligatory but conve-
nient criteria" for the determination of whether a non-international disturbance
is an internal armed conflict governed by Common Article 3. Weissbrodt, supra
note 81, at 339. These criteria include:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the dejure Government possesses
an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting
within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and
ensuring respect for the Convention. (2) That the legal Government is
obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insur-
gents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national
territory. (3) (a) That the dejure Government has recognized the insur-
gents as belligerents; or (b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a
belligerent; or (c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as
belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or (d) that
the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or
the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to inter-
national peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the
characteristics of a State. (b) That the insurgent civil authority exer-
cises de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil
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Conventions apply in their entirety if an armed conflict is inter-
national. Conflicts that are internal trigger fewer safeguards for
protected persons.8 4 Article 3, which is common to each of the
four Geneva Conventions, 85 sets forth the minimum protections
applicable to internal conflicts.86
The Bosnian conflict has internal8 7 elements, but is covered
by the full panoply of protections available in international88
armed conflicts. The parties to the conflict, including the Bos-
nian-Serbs, assented to adhere to the rules of war applicable to
an international armed conflict under an Agreement made on
May 22, 1992 ("Agreement"). 89 The text of the Geneva Conven-
authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provi-
sions of the Convention.
ICRC COmmENTARY, supra note 82, at 49-50.
84. ICRC CoMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 49.
85. This Comment will refer to Article 3 as "Common Article 3."
86. See infra note 95 (outlining the protections encompassed in Common
Article 3).
87. U.N. Security Council resolutions confirm that a state of armed conflict
exists in Bosnia. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg. at 1, U.N.S.C. Res. 787
(1992), reprinted in 1995 U.N.Y.B. 375; U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at
1, U.N.S.C. Res. 771 (1992), reprinted in 1995 U.N.Y.B. 366. See also Meron,
supra note 48, at 81 (commenting that while the conflict is largely interna-
tional, it has concurrent internal characteristics).
88. The First Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pur-
suant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Grave Breaches of
the Geneva Conventions and other Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter
Interim Report] found that "the law applicable in international armed conflict
should be applied to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia." Interim Report, supra, 1 14. See also James C. O'Brien,
The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. I-T'L L. 639, 647 (1993) ("[Ihe conflict is
clearly international: three nations have fought, primarily in the territory of
two of them (thus far), with a number of fronts and partisan or proxy groups
participating on behalf of each.... [It should not matter that some combatants
are citizens of the same nation-state."); Meron, supra note 48, at 81 ("[Tlhe un-
acknowledged, but clear, intervention in the Bosnian Conflict by Belgrade on
behalf of the Serbs, and against the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, could
transform the conflict from internal to international, even under the classic
principles of international law."); Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International
Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. IW'L L. & PoL'y
499 (1993) (arguing that various factors, such as the conflict's status as a "bel-
ligerency," outside intervention by neighboring nations, and various U.N. reso-
lutions, have internationalized the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed conflict).
89. See Agreement Signed on May 22, 1992, by Representatives of the
Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Serbian Democratic
Party, the Party of Democratic Action and the Croation Community, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.157/PC/60/Add.4, 1 37 (1993), cited in O'Brien, supra note 88, at 647 &
n.33. See also S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
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tions encourages warring factions to establish such agreements
in order to promote more extensive protections for victims of in-
ternal conflicts.90 As a result, the full breadth of the Geneva
Conventions apply, including provisions explicitly proscribing
gender-specific abuses 9 ' and violations constituting "grave
breaches."92
The Geneva Conventions define the class of people it pro-
tects as "those who... find themselves.. . in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals."93 Although it is unclear whether Bosnian-Muslims
and Croats are the same nationality as Bosnian-Serbs, the Ge-
neva Conventions would probably apply in their entirety to Bos-
nian-Serb offenses committed against Bosnian-Muslims and
S/RES/771 (1992) (noting that the parties to the conflict are bound to comply
with humanitarian norms during an armed conflict); Laurel E. Fletcher &
Kathleen M. Pratt, Time For Justice: The Case for International Prosecutions of
Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L.J. 77, 93-94 (1994) ("[All parties to the conflict have expressly agreed
to abide by all provisions of [the Geneva Conventions].").
90. The Geneva Conventions encourage warring factions to establish such
agreements.
91. The U.S. Department of State has pronounced that "the legal basis for
prosecuting troops for rape is well established under the Geneva Conventions."
Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Af-
fairs, to Sen. Arlen Spector (Jan. 27, 1993), reprinted in NEWMAN & WEIssB-
RODT, supra note 14, at 74. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Times of War provides that women are to be "especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, en-
forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 76, art. 27. In addition, the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War requires that women "be treated with all the
regard due to their sex." Geneva Convention I, supra note 76, art. 14.
92. The Geneva Conventions define "grave breaches" as the following acts:
1. willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health;
2. extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
3. compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile
power, or willfully depriving him of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed by the Convention;
4. the unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian; and
5. taking civilians as hostages.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 76, art. 50.
The Geneva Conventions do not explicitly list rape among the "grave
breach" provisions; however, the authoritative commentary of the International
Committee of the Red Cross has stated that rape constitutes a "grave breach."
See Meron, supra note 40, at 426-27.
93. Geneva Conventions, supra note 76, art. 4 (emphasis added).
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Croats.94 Should a court conclude otherwise, victims who are
not protected persons under the Geneva Conventions governing
international conflicts may seek civil redress pursuant only to
Common Article 3.
b. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
Common Article 395 requires each party to the conflict to
provide humane treatment to all "persons taking no active part
in the hostilities," regardless of nationality.96 Significantly,
Common Article 3 imposes obligations on any party to a non-
94. Fletcher & Pratt, supra note 89, at 96-97.
The ICRC commentary states that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to
nationals of an occupying power because a Convention should not "interfere in a
State's relationship with its own nationals." ICRC CommENTARY, supra note 82,
at 46. This line of reasoning is not applicable to the Bosnian-Muslim and Croat
victims of Bosnian-Serb aggression. Concluding that Bosnian-Muslims and
Croats are protected persons under Article IV will not interfere in a "State's
relationship with its own nationals." The Bosnian-Serb Republic is not a recog-
nized state, and the victims of its acts of ethnic cleansing are not "its own na-
tionals." Accordingly, Article IV should cover the victims of Bosnian-Serb
abuses, namely, the Bosnian-Muslims and Croats.
Other scholars have suggested that, in the context of the Bosnian conflict,
the court should define nationality as synonymous with ethnicity. See H HEL-
sum WATCH, supra note 34, at 396 n.6. The war in the former Yugoslavia is
divided along ethnic lines. To conclude that Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Mus-
lims or Croats are the same nationality ignores the inherent nature of the
conflict.
95. Common Article 3 provides in part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinc-
tion founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, muti-
lation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
The parties should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.




international armed conflict, not merely on governments.9 7
Hence, because Common Article 3 explicitly proscribes the non-
state action of organized armed groups, such parties should be
liable for violations of Common Article 3 under the Alien Tort
Statute.98
Pursuant to Common Article 3, all armed factions must pro-
hibit murder, cruel treatment, torture, outrages upon personal
dignity, and humiliating and degrading treatment.99 Commen-
tators widely agree that gender-specific abuses, such as rape,
forced impregnation, forced maternity, and forced prostitution,
are covered by the latter four categories of abuses. 00
97. Professor Meron asserts that the application of Common Article 3 to
warring factions in an internal conflict "should no longer be viewed as a legal
aberration... [I]n contemporary international law, international agreements
grant direct rights or confer obligations on individuals and groups with increas-
ing frequency." MERON, supra note 65, at 39-40. See also Jordan J. Paust, The
Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARv. Hum.
RTS. J. 51 (1992) ("[C]ommon article 3... applies also to those who are parties
to a conflict but who lack the status of state actors or those acting under color of
the state.").
98. See supra notes 57, 97 and accompanying text.
99. Geneva Conventions, supra note 76, art. 3. Rape and other gender-spe-
cific abuses are not explicitly covered under Common Article 3. Professor
MacKinnon observes that:
When it comes to women, at least to civilian casualties, the compla-
cency that surrounds peacetime extends to war, however the laws
read. And the more a conflict can be framed as within a state, as a civil
war, as social, as domestic, the less human rights are recognized as
being violated... and the less likely international human rights will
be found to be violated, no matter what was done.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WoMEN's
L.J. 59, 64 (1993).
100. No court has yet determined if gender-specific abuses are covered
under Common Article 3. Numerous international commentators, however, as-
sert that such abuses should be sanctioned pursuant to Common Article 3. Pro-
fessor Meron has stated:
The ICRC declared that the grave breach of "wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health" (Article 147 of the fourth
Geneva Convention) covers rape. If so, surely rape - in certain cir-
cumstances - can also rise to the level of such other grave breaches as
torture or inhuman treatment. Moreover, the massive and systematic
practice of rape and its use as a "national" instrument of "ethnic
cleansing" qualify it to be defined and prosecuted as a crime against
humanity.
Meron, supra note 40, at 426-27 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group notes that "[rnape ... violates the prohibition
of 'torture and other, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.'"
No JusTicE, No PEACE, supra note 29, at 52; see Deborah Blatt, Recognizing
Rape as a Method of Torture, 19 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 821 (1992);
Fletcher & Pratt, supra note 89, at 97 ("Even if the conflict were deemed non-
international in nature, rape and other forms of gender-based violence indispu-
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c. The Genocide Convention
The United Nations drafted the Genocide Convention in
1948.101 The Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide
as certain acts that are "committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group."10 2 Mass rapes and other gender-specific abuses, at least
to the extent that they are carried out to further the Bosnian-
Serb "ethnic cleansing" campaign and are calculated to destroy
Bosnian-Muslims, thus constitute acts of genocide. 10 3 Further-
more, any party to the crime is fully liable,10 4 including state
and non-state actors. Because of the recent escalation of aggres-
sion between ethnic groups, the Genocide Convention has be-
come increasingly salient. A United States court, however, has
never heard a claim under the Alien Tort Statute alleging acts of
genocide.
3. Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute
Although, on its face, the Alien Tort Statute appears to per-
mit suits against both government and individual defendants,
immunities grounded in federal statutory law, federal common
law, and customary international law bar suit against selected
defendants.' 0 5 For instance, governmental immunity is nearly
assured under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act FSIA.106
Consequently, plaintiffs largely invoke the Alien Tort Statute
against individual defendants. 10 7
tably constitute serious violations of the non-derogable minimum protections
set forth in Common Article 3."). Nevertheless, whether Common Article 3 pro-
hibits gender-specific abuses is beyond the scope of this Comment.
101. See supra note 77. Although the United States signed this instrument
that same year, it was not until 1986 that the Senate gave its advice and con-
sent for its ratification. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 58, at 402.
102. Genocide Conventions, supra note 77, art H. Article II stipulates what
acts constitute "genocide":
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
103. See, e.g., No JUSTICE, No PEAFE, supra note 29, at 6 & n.23; Fletcher &
Pratt, supra note 89, at 99; Kohn, supra note 40, at 202.
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 56 (listing immunities).
106. See supra note 56 (describing the FSIA).
107. Two categories of individuals are liable under the statute: state and




Individual liability for violations of international law gar-
nered significant recognition following the Nuremberg trials.108
International instruments developed during the post-World War
J- era, such as the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Con-
vention, codify the Nuremberg principle of individual liability as
to both state and non-state actors.10 9
Numerous plaintiffs since the Filartiga plaintiffs110 have
successfully invoked the Alien Tort Statute against individual
defendants acting under color of law or state authority.111 To
date, however, only one modern case has found a private individ-
ual liable under the Alien Tort Statute.1 12 Other courts have
questioned whether certain tortious non-state conduct is action-
able under the Alien Tort Statute. For example, the court in
immunity, act of state immunity, diplomatic immunity, and according to some
authorities, officials acting as agents or instrumentalities of foreign nations
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Individual immunities are less
extensive than governmental immunities. For a more extensive discussion of
how these immunities shield individual defendants from human rights claims
see NEwmAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 14, at 54-66.
108. The 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) en-
shrined the idea that individuals have rights and duties under international
law. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at
188 (1947). The Nuremberg Judgment provided that "crimes against interna-
tional law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punish-
ing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced .... " Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 58, at 68 n.67 (citing Judg-
ment of the International Military Tribunal).
109. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 76, art. 146 (stating parties
have an obligation to search out persons who have allegedly committed, or or-
dered to be committed, any grave breaches of the Convention); Genocide Con-
vention, supra note 77, art. IV (providing that persons committing genocide
"shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials, or private individual"); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES./39/46 [hereinafter Torture
Convention] (prohibiting acts of torture perpetrated by a "public official or other
person acting in an official capacity" or "by any person" whose acts "constitute
complicity or participation in torture").
110. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
112. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). However, the princi-
ple of private liability for violations of customary international law extends
back over 150 years in the United States. See, e.g., United States v. The Cargo
of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (piracy); United
States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (counterfeiting of foreign currency);
United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464 (1840) (slave trading).
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Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic113 questioned whether the
Alien Tort Statute covered terrorist acts committed by non-state
actors. 114 Yet, a year later, the same court in Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan115 left open the possibility that the Alien Tort Statute
reaches non-state action, stating that the Alien Tort Statute
"may conceivably have been meant to cover only private, non-
governmental acts that are contrary to a treaty or the law of
nations."116 Accordingly, no precedent holds that non-state ac-
tors can never be liable under the Alien Tort Statute. In appro-
priate cases, the Alien Tort Statute should cover the conduct of
non-state actors, but only where either a governing treaty or the
law of nations proscribes the alleged private tortious acts. 1 7
b. Command Responsibility
In addition to allowing suits against the perpetrators of
human rights abuses, the Alien Tort Statute permits claims
against those who order or condone such violations."18 For ex-
113. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
114. Id. The court affirmed a lower court's dismissal of an action brought by
personal representatives of 29 persons murdered in a terrorist attack in Israel.
Id. at 775. The three judges comprising the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel
each filed separate concurring opinions expressing widely divergent reasons for
dismissal. Yet, one principle they agreed upon was that terrorist acts commit-
ted by non-state actors do not rise to the level of a violation of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Statute. Id.
Commentators have criticized the Tel-Oren decision for its holding regard-
ing non-state actors. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unful-
filled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 894 (1990).
115. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 206. The Sanchez court dismissed an action brought by Nicara-
guan citizens for tortious acts perpetrated by the Nicaraguan Contra Forces.
As in Tel-Oren, the court found no treaty outlawing the challenged acts "when
committed by private individuals." Id. at 206. However, Judge (now Justice)
Scalia, writing for the court, held that the law of nations "does not reach pri-
vate, non-state conduct of this sort for the reasons stated by Judge Edwards in
Tel-Oren." Id. (emphasis added). By limiting its holding to the specific acts at
issue, the court left open the question whether customary international law
reaches the conduct of non-state actors in other cases.
117. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
118. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding mili-
tary intelligence director liable for acts of torture and murder perpetrated by
subordinates acting under the director's "direction" and "authority"); Abebe-Jiri
v. Negewo, No.1:90-cv2010, slip-op. (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 1993) (finding official
liable for acts of subordinates that he had authorized); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (imputing human rights abuses of
subordinate to an Argentine general who "authorized, approved, directed and
ratified" the plaintiff's disappearance and torture).
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ample, the doctrine of command responsibility' 19 imposes vicari-
ous liability on persons in a command structure for failure to
prevent or punish abuses that he or she knew or should have
known that subordinates were committing.120 Hence, military
or political leaders may be held civilly liable under the Alien
Tort Statute for abuses committed by troops under their com-
mand or control if such acts violate either a United States treaty
or the law of nations.
H. DOE v. KARADZIC AND K v. KARADZIC
On September 7, 1994, five Bosnian war victims, on behalf
of all victims of mass rape and gross human rights abuses 12 1
perpetrated by Bosnian-Serb forces, brought two related class
actions122 before a United States district court. 23 Both suits
named Radovan Karadzic, leader of Bosnian-Serb military
forces and self-proclaimed president of the Bosnian-Serb Repub-
lic, as defendant.' 24 Plaintiffs' causes of action were brought
pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. 25
Plaintiffs contended that Karadzic's conduct violated the
Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and customary
119. Command responsibility was reaffirmed at the Nuremberg Trials. See
United States v. von Leeb, Case No. 12 (1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALs OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG Mn.TrARY TRIBuNALs 512 (1950) [hereinaf-
ter NUREMBERG TRALS]; United States v. List, Case No. 7 (1948), reprinted in
NuREMBERG TRALS, supra, at 759. The Supreme Court recognized the doctrine
of command responsibility in United States v. Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
120. OBrien, supra note 88, at 651-52. O'Brien noted:
Simple justice requires that individuals be prosecuted only for acts
that they knew or should have known about. For persons in command
positions, notice may be imputed to defendants either from evidence of
regular reporting or from the existence of widespread reports that
would have been known to a reasonable person... The extensive me-
dia, UN and governmental reporting of atrocities in the former Yugo-
slavia should make it difficult for any person to plead ignorance: each
defendant will be required to detail and justify his or her steps to pre-
vent, repress or punish those responsible for violations of international
humanitarian law.
Id. at 652.
121. In addition to rape, plaintiffs allege acts of forced pregnancy, forced ma-
ternity, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, summary execution,
torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F.
Supp. 734, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 735.
124. Id.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). Plaintiffs brought additional claims pursuant
to the Torture Victim Protection Act, federal question jurisdiction, and the prin-
ciples of supplemental jurisdiction. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 735.
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international law.126 The court, however, granted Karadzic's
motion to dismiss,127 holding that plaintiffs did not contend de-
fendant's conduct violated a treaty128 and that "acts committed
by non-state actors129 do not violate the law of nations."130
The court noted that the related class-action suits were
based upon acts such as rape, genocide and extrajudicial killings
allegedly committed by Karadzic's forces. 131 Finding no jurisdic-
tion under the Alien Tort Statute, the Court held that no tor-
tious acts committed by non-state actors violate the "law of
126. Among others, plaintiffs cited to the following bodies of law: United
Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Con-
vention, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and customary international law. Plaintiff Doe's Complaint,
Karadzic (No. 93-Civ-1163).
127. The court dismissed the actions under the TVPA for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 741-42. Although much of the
analysis in this Comment could apply to the court's disposition of the TVPA
claims, a discussion of this Act is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The courts also dismissed plaintiffs' federal question claims, finding that no
implied right of action arose under the law of nations, and the law of nations
provided no substantive right to be free from private acts. Id. at 742-43.
128. Although the plaintiffs cited a number of United States treaties that
they alleged the defendant violated, the court stated that "plaintiffs do not con-
tend that their claim arises under a treaty of the United States." Karadzic, 866
F. Supp. at 738. Thus, the court based its discussion solely on the second prong
of the Alien Tort Statute, the law of nations.
129. Id. at 739. The Karadzic court held that the Bosnian-Serb Republic did
not constitute a state under international law. Id. at 738. It reasoned that
because the PLO, a highly organized entity enjoying diplomatic relations with
several countries, did not constitute a state in Tel-Oren, the less stable Bosnian-
Serb entity similarly fails to qualify as a state for international law purposes.
Id. In a footnote, the court observed:
The Second Circuit has limited the definition of "state" to "entities that
have a defined and a permanent population, that are under the control
of their own government, and that engage in or have the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities".. . . The current
Bosnia-Serb entity fails to meet this definition.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 740-41 (footnote added). Prefacing its discussion of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction with a brief consideration of head-of-state immunity, the
Karadzic court determined that the defendant did not currently enjoy absolute
immunity from suit. Id. at 738. The court noted, however, that the Executive
Branch could change Karadzic's status by officially recognizing him as a head of
state. Id. (citing Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp 128, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that a "determination of who qualifies as a head-of-state is made by the
Executive Branch, it is not a factual issue to be determined by the courts.")).
According to the court, official recognition of defendant as a head of state would
effectively strip the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant and there-
fore "militates against... exercisingjurisdiction over the instant action." Id. at
738.
131. Id. at 735.
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nations."13 2 The court reached this conclusion after focusing ex-
clusively on whether "purely private" acts of torture are actiona-
ble without analyzing whether the other acts alleged could rise
to the level of violations of customary international law.133
The court based its holding in part on Judge Edwards's con-
curring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.-34 The
court quoted Judge Edwards as stating that he "decline[d] to
read [the Alien Tort Statute] to cover non-state actors, absent
guidance from the Supreme Court on the statute's usage of the
term 'law of nations.' "135 The Karadzic court additionally relied
on the following passage from the opinion of Judge (now Justice)
Scalia in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan:
[We are aware of no treaty that purports to make the activities at is-
sue here unlawful when conducted by private individuals. As for the
law of nations - so-called 'customary international law,' arising from
'the customs and usage of civilized nations,' - we conclude that this
also does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort.1 3 6
The Karadzic court construed these precedents as placing
non-state conduct outside the scope of its jurisdiction. It con-
cluded that "the acts alleged in the instant action, while grossly
repugnant, cannot be remedied through [the Alien Tort
Statute]."'3 7
I. TEE APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS OF EGREGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A court adjudicating allegations of non-state tortious acts
under the Alien Tort Statute, including gender-specific abuses,
should determine if a United States treaty or customary inter-
national law proscribes the conduct. Accordingly, the Karadzic
court should have determined whether the tortious acts imputed
132. The Karadzic court concluded that the Alien Tort Statute does not
cover the conduct of the Bosnian-Serb military forces because the acts, though
morally repugnant, cannot be construed as either "official torture or state initi-
ated." Id. at 741. The court added that it "decline[d] to extend [the Alien Tort
Statute] to redress acts of torture engaged in by private individuals." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 739-41. Additional authorities the court cited include Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and Linder v. Calero Porto-
carrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990), which both held that the conduct of
Nicaraguan Contras did not rise to the level of state action. Id.
135. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 740.
136. 770 F.2d at 206, quoted by Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 740.
137. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 740-41.
1995] 1437
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1413
to Karadzic violate either of these two sources of international
law. At least two international instruments, the Geneva Con-
ventions and the Genocide Convention, should have permitted
the court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
claims.
A. TaE KARADzIc COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE APPLICABLE
TREATIES AND TO APPLY PRECEDENT CORRECTLY
The Karadzic court seriously erred in two fundamental
ways. First, the court failed to analyze the plaintiffs' treaty-
based claims under the Alien Tort Statute. 38 According to the
Karadzic court, the plaintiffs did not contend their claim arose
under a treaty of the United States.139 The plaintiffs, however,
explicitly listed treaty-based claims in their complaint, including
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide
Convention. 140  This gap in the court's analysis is
inexplicable. 141
Second, the court misconstrued precedent by holding that
all tortious acts committed by non-state actors are unreachable
under the "law of nations" of the Alien Tort Statute. Although
the Karadzic court examined plaintiffs' claims based upon the
law of nations, it strayed beyond the limited holding of applica-
ble precedents to announce an unsupported, sweeping rule. In
determining that the Alien Tort Statute does not cover non-state
conduct, the court misquoted Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren.
Judge Edwards stated, "[W]hile I have little doubt that the
trend in international law is toward a more expansive allocation
of rights and obligations to entities other than states, I decline to
read section 1350 to cover torture by non-state actors .. . .142
The court omitted the words "torture by" from its quotation of
138. The Karadzie court should have analyzed the acts imputed to Karadzic
under the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. See infra part
mI.B.
139. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
141. Karadzic's conduct is expressly proscribed under the Geneva Conven-
tions and the Genocide Convention. See infra part III.B-C.
142. 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The precedential authority of Judge
Edward's opinion is of limited value. The opinion was one of three concurring
opinions. See supra note 114. In addition, Judge Edwards failed to mention
that at least one United States treaty, which has risen to the level of customary
international law, proscribes non-state acts of torture: Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing
non-state actor's liability for acts proscribed under Common Article 3).
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Judge Edwards, 43 altering his concurring opinion from its focus
on acts of torture committed by non-state actors to all acts com-
mitted by non-state actors.
Furthermore, none of the precedents the court relied on
held that private actors bear no obligations under international
law.1' Prior cases expressly left open the possibility that pri-
vate acts could constitute violations of the law of nations. 145
Precedents the court referred to confined their holdings to the
specific facts and circumstances before them, and made no at-
tempt to shield all non-state acts from liability under the Alien
Tort Statute. 146
The Karadzic court, by contrast, did not distinguish prece-
dent from the unique facts before it. For example, the plaintiffs'
in Tel-Oren brought a claim for non-state terrorist acts, unrecog-
nized as violations of customary international law, that were
committed during peacetime. 147 The Karadzic court, however,
was presented with tortious acts prohibited by customary inter-
national law and perpetrated during an armed conflict, 148 and
triggering the application of humanitarian law, including some,
if not all, provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 14 9 Conse-
quently, the Karadzic court should have found subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Geneva Conventions because the
Conventions are currently considered customary international
law 50 and proscribe the non-state conduct imputed to
Karadzic. 151
Moreover, by exclusively focusing on the plaintiffs' allega-
tions of torture, the court overlooked the plaintiffs' allegations of
genocide.152 The Genocide Convention is widely regarded to
have achieved the status of customary international law and to
143. Compare text accompanying note 132 with text accompanying note 142
(illustrating the Karadzic court's alteration of Judge Edwards's holding in Tel-
Oren).
144. See supra part I.C.3.a.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116 (discussing Sanchez-Espi-
noza v. Reagan)
146. See supra part I.C.3.a.
147. See supra note 114.
148. See supra note 87 (citing U.N. Security Council resolutions confirming
that a state of armed conflict exists in Bosnia).
149. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. (explaining that the Ge-
neva Conventions are only applicable during periods of armed conflict).
150. See supra note 65 (noting that the Geneva Conventions to have risen to
the level of customary international law).
151. See infra part H.B-C (discussing case against Karadzic).
152. See supra notes 126, 131-133 and accompanying text.
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reach private conduct.1 53 The court, however, ignored these
norms of customary international law, erroneously taking refuge
behind its overly broad conclusion that non-state actors are not
liable for violations of customary international law under the
Alien Tort Statute.
B. PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF KARADZIC'S ALLEGED TORTIOUS
ACTS PURSUANT TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The Karadzic court should have examined plaintiffs' allega-
tions of Karadzic's tortious acts under the Geneva Conven-
tions.154 This Comment suggests that the court should have
followed a four step inquiry to determine whether Karadzic vio-
lated the Conventions: first, which provisions of the Geneva
Conventions apply to the Bosnian armed conflict? Second, have
the alleged torts proscribed by the applicable provisions of the
Geneva Conventions? Third, were plaintiffs within the class of
persons protected by the Geneva Conventions? Finally, as head
of the self-designated Bosnian-Serb Republic and armed forces,
should Karadzic be individually liable for the acts imputed to
him?
The first step of the inquiry would have involved an analysis
of whether the Bosnian armed conflict is of an international or
internal nature,155 determine the level of protection plaintiffs
receive under the Geneva Conventions. A court, however, could
base its determination solely upon the May 22, 1992, Agree-
ment,156 under which the Serbian Democratic Party SDP agreed
to be bound by the Geneva Conventions germane to interna-
tional armed conflicts.1 57
The second step of the inquiry should comprise a determina-
tion of whether the human rights abuses plaintiffs alleged are
torts that violate of the Geneva Conventions. The Karadzic
class action suits alleged acts of rape, forced pregnancy, forced
prostitution, forced maternity, torture, summary execution, and
cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment.158 Clearly, these
153. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 121, 126 and accompanying text (explaining that plain-
tiffs alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions).
155. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (describing the internal
versus international nature of an armed conflict). The conflict is widely consid-
ered to be international in scope. See supra note 88.
156. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.




acts fit the classic definition of a "tort."159 Additionally, they
constitute violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Times of War (Geneva Convention IV) explicitly proscribes rape
and enforced prostitution.160 It also implicitly covers acts of
forced maternity and forced pregnancy under its prohibition of
any "form of indecent assault."1
6
'
Moreover, according to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), rape is also prescribed under the "Grave
Breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 16 2 In addition,
the Geneva Conventions explicitly state that torture, summary
executions, and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment are
"grave breaches." 63 It is important to note, however, that the
essence of the actions before the court 6 4 was the recognition
that gender-specific abuses are worthy of the same degree of
condemnation under international human rights law as other
forms of violence.
The third step of the inquiry should have been whether
plaintiffs are members of the class of persons protected under
the Conventions. According to the Conventions, protected per-
sons include those who are in the hands of a party "of which they
are not nationals." 65 Yet, whether or not the Croation and
Muslim victims are considered nationals of the Bosnian-Serbs,
the Bosnian-Serbs agreed to be bound by all of the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the Bosnian-Serbs should
159. A tort is "[a] private or civil wrong or injury, other than a breach of
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for
damages." BLAcK's LAw DicnoNARY 1335 (5th ed. 1979).
160. Geneva Convention IV provides that women are to be "especially pro-
tected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 76, art. 27.
161. Id. Gender-specific abuses are further covered by the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III),
which requires that women "be treated with all the regard due to their sex."
Geneva Conventions, supra note 76, art. 14.
162. See supra note 92 (listing the "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conven-
tions). In addition, the U.S. Department of State has pronounced that "the
legal basis for prosecuting troops for rape is well established under the Geneva
Conventions." See supra note 101.
163. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 5 (discussing Ivs action against Karadzic, which encom-
passes excessively gender-specific abuses). See also Wu, supra note 43 (discuss-
ing I's action against Karadzic and the tension between IKs action and the
action brought by the Doe plaintiffs).
165. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 76, art. 4.
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be liable under the Geneva Conventions for abuses perpetrated
against the Bosnian-Muslims and Croats. 166
The court's last line of inquiry should have been whether
Karadzic may be held liable for the acts of the Bosnian-Serb
forces. 167 The defendant, as the leader of the SDP, agreed to
adhere to the legal obligations and duties set forth in the Ge-
neva Conventions. 168 Therefore, the court should have assumed
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims if they suffi-
ciently alleged that Karadzic committed torts in violation of the
Geneva Conventions.
The Geneva Conventions expressly prescribe individual lia-
bility "for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches of the present Convention."169 Although
the plaintiffs did not allege that Karadzic directly perpetrated
any torts, under the well-established doctrine of command re-
sponsibility, plaintiffs need not show that defendant expressly
ordered or was directly involved in the tortious conduct.' 70 To
establish subject matter jurisdiction, it is enough that the plain-
tiffs alleged that Bosnian-Serb forces under defendant's com-
mand and control committed extensive human rights abuses.
171
Pursuant to command responsibility, the court should have in-
ferred that the defendant at least permitted, if not secretly or-
dered, his forces to commit such acts.172
Moreover, the court could have imputed notice to the de-
fendant that his forces committed the alleged abuses.' 78 During
the Bosnian conflict, the media, the United Nations, and govern-
mental sources regularly reported the widespread atrocities that
the Bosnian-Serb forces, under the defendant's command and
166. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the authoritative
commentary of the ICRC regarding "protected persons" under the Conventions).
167. Plaintiffs allege that defendant had "command authority over the Bos-
nian-Serb military forces fighting against the government of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, with the support of the government of Yugoslavia and its army.
Acting under [Karadzic's] command and control, his forces have inflicted a cam-
paign of gross human rights violations upon the civilian population." See supra
note 1. These allegations are taken as true for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss.
168. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (citing the Agreement to com-
ply with the Geneva Conventions)
169. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 76, art. 146.
170. See O'Brien, supra note 88, at 651; part I.C.3.b. (describing the doctrine
of command responsibility).
171. See supra note 118 (discussing the doctrine of command responsibility).




control, committed.174 In addition, Karadzic's troops have acted
with impunity, making no effort to hide their practices of ethnic
cleansing.175 The widespread knowledge of the Bosnian-Serb
abuses and public nature of the acts have made it difficult for
Karadzic to disavow knowledge of the alleged abuses.
Because Karadzic has not attempted to stop the widespread
rapes or hold any of his soldiers or commanders accountable for
these abuses, 176 it is unlikely that Karadzic will be able to offer
as a defense that he took steps "to prevent, repress or punish
those responsible for violations of international humanitarian
law."177 Accordingly, the court should have found that at least
for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs alleged facts
which, if true, could have supported the conclusion that
Karadzic may be held liable for the acts imputed to him under
the doctrine of command responsibility.
C. PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF KARADZIC'S ALLEGED TORTIOUS
ACTS PURSUANT TO COMMON ARTICLE 3 OF THE
GENEVA CONvENIONS
The court's analysis under Common Article 3 should be sim-
ilar to the analysis regarding the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to international conflicts. Again, the analysis has
four steps: (1) whether Common Article 3 is applicable to the
Bosnian armed conflict; (2) whether the plaintiffs are protected
by Common Article 3; (3) whether plaintiff's alleged torts are
proscribed by Common Article 3; and (4) whether the defendant
is individually liable for the acts imputed to him. 78
The first and second steps of the inquiry are straightfor-
ward. Common Article 3 applies to the Bosnian conflict because
it meets the definitional criteria of an armed conflict. 7 9 Fur-
174. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (providing examples of re-
ports of atrocities).
175. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (highlighting specific re-
ports of widespread atrocities for which no Bosnian-Serb forces have been held
accountable).
176. See supra notes 40, 119 and accompanying text (discussing Karadzic's
command responsibility in light of reports of widespread abuses).
177. See supra note 119 (to date, Karadzic has not punished anyone for war
crimes).
178. See supra part BELB.
179. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (citing evidence support-
ing existence of an armed conflict). The ICRC Commentary sets forth a number
of "nonobligatery" criteria helpful in determining if application of Common Arti-
cle 3 is appropriate. See supra note 83. The Bosnian conflict undoubtedly
meets nearly each criteri. The Bosnian-Serbs possess an organized military
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thermore, Common Article 3 protects the plaintiffs because it
covers all "persons taking no active part in hostilities." 80
Third, the court should have concluded that plaintiffs prop-
erly alleged torts committed in violation of a United States
Treaty-Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Plain-
tiffs contended that Karadzic's forces committed acts of torture,
summary execution, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment, all acts that Common Article 3 explicitly proscribes.' 8 '
Furthermore, the court should have concluded that plaintiffs' al-
legations of rape and other gender-specific abuses violate Com-
mon Article 3's prohibitions regarding acts of "cruel treatment,"
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment," and "torture."
Finally, the court should have found that Common Article
3's provisions apply not only to states or governments, but to any
party of an armed conflict.' 8 2 The Bosnian-Serb forces are a
party to the conflict. Common Article 3 thus reaches their non-
state conduct, without conferring upon them any additional
political or legal recognition.'8 3 Therefore, under the doctrine of
command responsibility, Karadzic is individually liable for any
violations his forces commit in contravention of Common Article
3.184
force; Radovan Karadzic, as head of the armed forces, is responsible for its acts;
the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb Republic controls a "determinate territory;
and the Republic has the means to ensure respect for the convention. More-
over, the Bosnian government was obliged to have recourse to its military forces
against the Bosnian-Serb forces in control of two-thirds of the Bosnian terri-
tory, and, by signing the Agreement of May 22, 1992, has accorded the Bosnian-
Serbs with the status of belligerents for the purposes of Common Article 3. In
addition, the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council of
the United Nations as being a threat to international peace. See supra note 48
(stating that this threat led to the Security Council's establishment of an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal).
180. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Common Article 3 is meant
to remove the very defense which the Karadzic court, in large part, rested its
decision upon, namely the non-state conduct by a defendant. Common Article 3
was designed to protect all persons caught in internal conflicts from humanita-
rian abuses by any party to the conflict without regard to that party's legal or
political status. Id.
184. See supra part I.C.3.b.
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D. PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF KARADZIC'S ALLEGED TORTIOUS
AcTs PURSUANT TO THE GENOCIDE CONvENT[ON
Plaintiffs also properly asserted jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute for acts of genocide. 18 5 Consistent with an analysis
of Karadzic's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' claims that the Bos-
nian-Serb forces, under Karadzic's command and control, ethni-
cally cleansed areas of Bosnia with the intent to destroy the non-
Serb population are presumed true.186 Consequently, the court
need not have established Karadzic's intent to commit genocide
to have held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over plain-
tiffs' claims.
The court, however, should have determined whether it
could have held Karadzic liable under the Genocide Convention
and whether the abuses plaintiffs alleged could constitute acts of
genocide pursuant to the Genocide Convention. According to Ar-
ticle I of the Genocide Convention, Karadzic may be directly
liable for ordering or condoning acts of genocide whether he is
considered a non-state or official actor.' 8 7 The allegations of
Bosnian-Serb acts of rape, forced pregnancy, and forced mater-
nity fit the definition of the crime of genocide, because they
cause "serious bodily or mental harm" to the Bosnian Muslims
or Bosnian Croatians. 8  In addition, the Bosnian Serb cam-
paign of "ethnic cleansing," including gender-specific abuses,
constitutes "conditions of life calculated to bring about the phys-
ical destruction" of the Muslims and Croatians "in whole or in
part."18 9 Moreover, the plaintiffs' allegations of acts of Bosnian-
Serb forced impregnation of Muslims and Croats to increase the
birth of Serbian children "impose[s] measures intended to pre-
vent births within the [Muslim and Croat] groups."190 Accord-
ingly, United States courts encountering this issue should confer
subject matter jurisdiction over allegations of non-state acts of
genocide under the Alien Tort Statute.
185. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 126 (asserting that plaintiffs' allegations of abuse
should be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss).
187. Genocide Convention, supra note 77, art. 3.
188. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 104; see also part LB (describing the Bosnian-Serb cam-
paign of ethnic cleansing).
190. Genocide Conventions, supra note 77, art. 2(d).
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CONCLUSION
The Karadzic court failed to mention, let alone assess, piv-
otal, yet basic, norms of international law applicable to human
rights abuses perpetrated during an armed conflict. Moreover,
the court erroneously concluded, by misreading and misquoting
precedent, that the Alien Tort Statute does not cover non-state
conduct. In so doing, the court narrowed its analysis, consider-
ing only allegations of torture. The court ignored all other
claims, particularly the allegations of gender-specific abuses.
The court thus mistakenly treated the distinction between offi-
cial and private acts as the sine qua non of liability under the
Alien Tort Statute. The Karadzic court's failure to properly ana-
lyze plaintiff's claims reflects poorly on the United States' com-
mitment to safeguard human rights.
A proper analysis under the Alien Tort Statute should hold
that non-state actors, particularly heads of armed opposition
groups; are accountable for non-state tortious acts proscribed
under international law. To hold otherwise is to bar legitimate
claimants from bringing suit under the Alien Tort Statute
against private actors for egregious violations of human rights.
The reviewing court should thus conclude that both the Geneva
Conventions and the Genocide Convention provide subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute for the acts im-
puted to Karadzic. Such a holding recognizes all war crimes and
acknowledges that mass rape and other gender specific abuses
violate provisions of the Geneva Conventions and may rise to
the level of genocide.
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